I'm a philosophy graduate student at the University of California at Davis. Prior to graduate school, I earned a BA in Political Studies at Bard College in upstate NY and a TEFL certificate from Cambridge University in England. Whilst in graduate school, I have been a visiting student at Arche in St. Andrews, the Australian National University, and the University of Arizona.
My research interests center primarily on ontology and modality. With regards to ontology, I defend a heterogeneous account of the nature of physical objects. In particular, I argue that the primary/secondary quality distinction is paralleled by a primary/secondary object distinction. I defend an standard Realist account of primary objects and a Response-Dependent Realist account of secondary objects. With regards to modality, I take "o has p necessarily" and "o has p accidentally" not to be contrapositives. That is, I argue that -- when certain preconditions aren't met -- an object can have a property p without having p either necessarily or accidentally.
Current works in progress:
Mind the (Modal) Gap: I argue that there's a tension between Ontological Realism (the view that humans play no constitutive role in the existence of objects) and de re Essentialism (the view that some actual objects have some of their properties essentially). Namely, a commitment to Ontological Realism places one in an epistemic position vis-a-vis objects such that one does not have sufficient access to objects to ascertain, of any particular object o, whether or not it has p essentially. George Bealer recognizes this tension and attempts to defuse it by offering a rationalist account of modal knowledge. I argue that Bealer's account fails to justify de re Essentialism.
Modal Methodology: This paper poses the following question: "Which methods of investigation lead to knowledge of de re modal facts?". I argue that two prominent methodologies, thought experiments and conceptual analysis, do not yield knowledge of de re modal facts (e.g. that actual object is essentially p). Rather, they yield knowledge of hypothetical modal facts (for any x, if x=o, then x is essentially p).
Intrinsic Properties & Essential Properties: It is often claimed that an object's intrinsic properties determine its essential properties. I present several counterexamples to this thesis. I then examine various extrinsic properties we might add to the equation, viz. an object's intrinsic properties + extrinsic properties e determine its essential properties, an object's intrinsic properties + extrinsic properties e* determine its essential properties, etc. I present counterexamples to each suggested supplementation. Ultimately, I argue that neither an object's intrinsic properties nor a combination of its intrinsic properties and its extrinsic properties can determine its essential properties. It looks like we have a problem. Clearly, objects have essential properties. And clearly their so having is not brute. Something determines which properties an object has essentially. I argue that the failure to find a supervenience base for essential properties turns on a tacit assumption that objects are constitutively independent of humans. We won't find a supervenience basis for essential properties in the (human-independent) world because no such basis exists. If we wish to find such a basis, we must look to ourselves. In particular, we must look at the extrinsic properties an object possess in virtue of being thought by us to be a particular way.
The Heterogeneous Nature of Objects: It is standard to defend a homogenous nature account of physical objects, viz. to argue e.g. that all physical objects are just four-dimensional hunks of matter or to argue that all physical objects are just bundles of properties. I argue that we ought, instead, to defend a heterogeneous nature account of physical objects. There are two fundamentally different kinds of physical objects: primary objects and secondary objects. Primary objects are, roughly, just four-dimensional hunks of matter. Secondary objects are, roughly, fusions of primary objects and properties.
The Hidden Costs of Anti-Essentialism: Figuring out which objects have which properties essentially is notoriously difficult: we have conflicting and variable intuitions. Some have suggested that we by-pass this difficulty by simply denying the truth of Essentialism. Anti-Essentialists, of course, have to explain away our essentialistic beliefs, e.g. that Phar Lap couldn't have been the number two. But, what has been overlooked, is that there are many other beliefs which -- though not themselves essentialistic beliefs -- rely on the truth of Essentialism. For instance, if Essentialism is false, then there's no straight-forward way to explain the difference between alterational change (standardly taken to be a loss or gaining of an accidental property) and substantial change (standardly taken to be the loss of an essential property). Additionally, if Essentialism is false, then there's no straight-forward way to explain our ability to engage in counterfactual objectual reflection. I see the Eiffel Tower. I reflect on it. What is it that makes the Eiffel Tower the target of my reflection? The Essentialist can say I reflect on the (unique) object which has modal profile m. The Anti-Essentialist cannot say this. For him, the counterfactual possibilities for the Eiffel Tower are exactly the same as the counterfactual possibilities for Phar Lap. They both could have been anything. What, then, is it that ties my counterfactual objectual reflection to the Eiffel Tower (rather than to Phar Lap). Finally, and more controversially, if Essentialism is false, then nihilism threatens. It is a (controversial, but defended) thesis that ordinary object terms have essential import. To say that a term has essential import is to say that, in order to satisfy that term, an object must satisfy not only certain descriptive conditions, but also certain modal conditions. For instance, one might think that to satisfy the term "table" it is not enough that an object merely be physical, it must also be the case that an object is essentially physical. If such a (linguistic) thesis is correct and the Anti-Essentialist is correct in thinking no actual objects have any of their properties essentially, then there are no tables.